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CASE NOTES
a time when the average worker labored from ten to sixteen hours per
day. The average worker today is employed eight hours a day while the
polls are usually open from ten to fourteen hours. Therefore, modern
working conditions coupled with the increased speed of transportation
seem to antiquate the practical necessity for the type of legislation
involved.
The probable effect of upholding the constitutionality of "pay-as-you-
vote" statutes will be to increase the number of voters. 17 But the success of
an enticement to vote does not seem to justify putting its cost on some
other citizen.
PUBLIC LAW-ILLINOIS LIQUOR CONTROL ACT
CREDIT RESTRICTIONS
The plaintiffs, Max Weisberg, a retail liquor dealer, and Stag Beer
Corporation, an Illinois wholesale beer distributor, brought suit against
the Illinois Liquor Control Commission seeking a declaratory judgment
that the Illinois statutory prohibition on the sale of liquor on credit was
unconstitutional.' On appeal by plaintiff Weisberg only, the Illinois Su-
preme Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute complained of.
Weisberg v. Taylor, 409 Ill. 384, ioo N.E. 2d 748 (i951).
Plaintiff's main contention was that the credit provisions 2 of the Illinois
Liquor Control Act were unreasonable and confiscatory in that they cre-
ated an arbitrary and discriminatory classification against retail licensees in
requiring them to buy beer for cash but permitting distributors to pur-
chase the same on credit. The plaintiff asserted that such a class discrimi-
nation contravenes Section 2 of Article IIs of the Illinois Constitution and
17 In June, 1948, the United States Supreme Court refused certiorari for the Ken-
tucky case which had struck down the "pay-as-you-vote" statute. The poor turn-
out of voters in the 1948 presidential election may have influenced the present de-
cision in this presidential election year of 1952.
1Ill. Rev. Stat. (949) c. 43,§ 122.
2Ibid. The provisions of the statute pertinent to the constitutionality issues here
involved are: (a) it is unlawful for any retailer to accept, receive, or borrow money
or anything of value, or accept or receive credit from any manufacturer or distribu-
tor, except ordinary merchandising credit for a period not to exceed thirty days;
(b) a retailer who is delinquent in his merchandising account for thirty days or more
is forbidden from purchasing or acquiring alcoholic liquor, and a manufacturer or
distributor is forbidden from knowingly granting or extending credit or selling alco-
holic liquors to such delinquent dealers; (c) the purchase price of beer sold to a
retailer must be paid in cash on or before delivery of the beer; (d) beer sold to dis-
tributors or importing distributors shall be paid for in cash on or before fifteen days
after the delivery of the beer.
3 i. Const. Art. a, § z: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law."
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the Fourtecnth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.,
The courts of Illinois have been quick to assert that seemingly arbitrary
statutory classifications in regard to the commerce of liquor are in fact
reasonable classifications. Thus, as recently as the May term, 1950, the
Supreme Court of Illinois, in Bairn v. Fleck,5 held that a statute requiring
the use of a container with a minimum capacity of one fluid ounce at the
time of sale did not create an arbitrary classification, even though the
statute exempted from its provisions sales made on boats and railroad cars.
This same court6 upheld an ordinance denying a license to sell liquor at
retail in grocery stores and meat markets but permitting such a license in
other retail establishments. 7
The-Supreme Court of the United States has upheld a Michigan statute
prohibiting the licensing of a female as a bartender unless she was the wife
or daughter of the male owner of a licensed liquor' establishment.8 It has
also upheld a Kentucky statute restricting liquor shipments to common
carriers and prohibiting transportation of liquor by contract carriers.9
In the immediate case, the Illinois Supreme Court made no reference to
the construction placed by other state courts on similar liquor control
statutes. The court did cite one Massachusetts case10 which stated that the
general purpose for imposing such credit restrictions in liquor control acts
was to avoid the evils which result from the control of retail liquor dealers
by manufacturers, wholesalers, or importers through the power of credit.
In a recent Rhode Island decision,11 the court had before it the question
of the constitutionality of certain credit restriction rules imposed by the
Rhode Island Liquor Control Administration in accordance with that
state's Liquor Control Act.1 2 These rules13 are very similar to the credit
4 U.S. Const. Amend. 14: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty or property without due process of the law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law."
54o6 III. 193, 92 N.E. 2d 770 (1950).
6 Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Mayor of Danville, 367 Ill. 3 o, 11 N.E. 2d
388 (1937).
7 Other Illinois cases also in point are: Village of Kincaid v. Vecchi, 332 Ill. 586,
164 N.E. I99 (1928); Tarantina v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 254 11. 624, 98 N.E.
999 (1912); People v. Harrison, 256 I11. 102, 99 N.E. 903 (1912). But cf. City of
Chicago v. Netcher, 183 Ill. 104, 55 N.E. 707 (1899).
8 Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
9 Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939).
0 Sullivan v. Cann's Cabins, 309 Mass. 519, 36 N.E. 2d 371 (1941).
11 Sepe v. Daneker, 76 R.I. x6o, 68 A. 2d iol (1949).
12 Rhode Island Public Laws (194o ) c. 814, § 8.
13 Rhode Island Liquor Control Administration Rules, Rules 53, 54- In substance the
rules provide that no alcoholic beverages shall be sold by any manufacturer or whole-
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restriction provisions of the Illinois Liquor Control Act. The Rhode Island
court upheld the constitutionality of both the statute and the rules, giving
as its reasons: (i) that the privileges and immunities clause does not in-
clude the business of selling intoxicating liquor; (2) that there is no prop-
erty right in a liquor license; (3) that the rules are not discriminatory
because they apply to all retail licensees.
The Connecticut Liquor Control Act 4 provides that no permitee shall
borrow money or receive credit from any manufacturer or wholesaler for
a period in excess of thirty days. In State v. Zazzaro,'5 the statute was
attacked as discriminatory. Readily admitting that the statute was dis-
criminatory, the Supreme Court of Connecticut insisted that the discrim-
ination was not unconstitutional. The court stated that a law which is uni-
form in its application is not rendered invalid merely because of the
limited number of persons who will be affected by it.
The courts of the United States have always looked upon the liquor
traffic as an evil to be tolerated but one to be strictly confined. In fact,
from a study of the cases it seems that any act controlling liquor traffic
will, except in rare circumstances,16 be upheld as constitutional even
though there is obvious class discrimination made in the statute. In al-
most any other field of commerce, such discrimination would be rejected
as contravening the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution.1 7
In Zukaitis v. Fitzgerald,' a federal district court had before it a section
of the Michigan Liquor Control Act'0 which provided that every sale of
alcoholic liquor in state liquor stores and by specially designated distrib-
utors shall be for cash only. The act made no specific mention of credit
restrictions in other relationships of the liquor industry, and thus to all
appearances there was no arbitrary discrimination between classes. How-
ever, the Michigan court in this instance went one step further than the
Illinois court; it held that the express provisions in the act as to retailers
saler to any retailer except for cash or on terms requiring payment by the purchaser
within thirty days from the date of delivery, and that if the manufacturer or whole-
saler knew that the retailer was in arrears for payment of alcoholic beverages, he
could sell to such retailer for cash only.
14Conn. Gen. Stat. (1939) c. 89, § 968(e).
15 1z8 Conn. i6o, 2o A. zd 737 (1941).
16Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit, 321 U.S. 383 (1944); State v. Jordan, 207 La. 78,
20 So. 2d 543 (1944); City of Chicago v. Netcher, 183 Ill. 104, 55 N.E. 707 (1899).
17 State Board of Equalization of California v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59
(1936); State v. Wheelock, 114 Vt. 350, 45 A. 2d 430 0946); Alexander v. Graves,
178 Miss. 583, 173 So. 417 (1937); Franklin Stores Co. v. Burnett, i2o N.J.L. 596, 1 A.
2d 25 (S. Ct., 1938).
18 18 F. Supp. 1ooo (S.D. Mich., 1936).
19 Mich. Comp. Laws (948) c. 436, S 16.
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impliedly recognized an extension of credit in other relationships, and
rendered void a regulation of the Michigan Liquor Control Commission
which prohibited credit from a manufacturer to a wholesaler. The find-
ing of such a "classification by implication" in the absence of an express
classification by the legislature would seem to substantiate the argument
that when the subject matter of the control is the liquor traffic, not only
will the courts allow practically unlimited discretion to the legislature in
curbing the traffic, but they will independently take affirmative steps to
curb the liquor industry without much deliberation as to whether they are
arbitrarily discriminating against certain classes.
It would seem then that plaintiff, Max Weisberg, in the instant case
could not sustain a claim that the statute invaded the privileges and immu-
nities clause of the Federal Constitution since the right to sell intoxicating
liquor is not one of the privileges and immunities protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment. 20 Also, since the right to a license tosell'intoxicating
liquor is not a fundamental right incident to citizenship, 21 he had no justi-
fication for calling on the equal protection clause of the Federal Consti-
tution and Section 2 of Article II of the Illinois Constitution to enforce
such a right.
The Supreme Court of Washington 22 has stated that the constitutional-
ity of a liquor statute is scarcely debatable, the statute being but another
form of regulation of the traffic in intoxicating liquors. This very reason-
ing, though it may seem harsh and radical, appears to represent the think-
ing of the United States courts today. A less stringent rule was laid down
by a federal court28 in a recent decision when it said that the state may
impose more stringent provisions upon a person in the liquor business
than against those engaged in other callings, but that this fact affords no
justification for discrimination between those similarly situated who may
be or may desire to become engaged in the calling of liquor.
If then, in the instant case, we take into account these general attitudes
toward liquor control legislation, and the evils which result from the con-
trol of the retailer by the wholesale dealer through the power of credit,
it seems clear that the imposition of such credit restrictions by the Illinois
legislature is justified.
20State v. Wipke, 345 Mo. 283, 133 S.W. zd 354 (1939); People v. Smith, 368 Ill.
328, 14 N.E. zd 8z (1938).
21 State v. Cummings, 178 Tenn. 378, 158 S.W. 2d 713 (1942); Wilkinson v. Mur-
phy, z37 Ala. 332, 186 So. 487 (1939); O'Connor v. Rathje, 368 Ill. 83, 12 NE. zd 878
(1938).
22 Lcwer v. Cornelius, 72 Wash. 124, 129 Pac. 913 (1913).
23 Glicker v. Michigan Liquor Control Commission, 16o F. zd 96 (C.A. 6th, 1947).
